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SINGLE-ENGINE FIREFIGHTING AIR TANKER HUMAN FACTORS 
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Boise, Idaho USA 
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This paper describes the unique environment and safety challenges for pilots who fly single-
engine air tanker (SEAT) firefighting aircraft, and the highlights from a human factors (HF) 
analysis of SEAT operations conducted in 2009.  The HF analysis used the FAA’s Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) because of its broad examination of HF issues and 
prior use in aviation.  We examined operations, training, and the applicable safety reports, and we 
interviewed or received anonymous surveys from 71 stakeholders – pilots, supervisors, and 
managers.  The analysis yielded 63 recommendations, many of which were adopted for the 2010 
fire season.  Despite a busier fire season in 2010 compared with 2009, SEAT safety improved.  
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) attributes this improvement, in part, to the adopted 
recommendations. 
 
 From 1997-2007 the single-engine air tanker (SEAT) accident rate was three times higher than the general 
aviation (GA) accident rate in the U.S. (BLM, 2009; NTSB, 2009).  While the SEAT firefighting mission is 
inherently more challenging than typical GA flights, the BLM, the agency responsible for the SEAT program, 




 The majority of SEAT firefighting aircraft are AT-802s, a turbo-prop aircraft designed for crop-dusting 
(Figure 1).  Because aerial firefighting is predominantly a summer activity, many SEAT pilots earn their living 
during the rest of the year in agricultural operations.  Agricultural operations are typically flown in the early 
morning with light or no winds, over flat terrain, with little or no radio communications, and few, if any, other 
aircraft in the vicinity.  Agricultural operations and training are fairly unstructured under FAR Part-137. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Air Tractor AT-802 SEAT aircraft, a turbo-prop designed for dropping chemicals from low altitudes. 
 
 In contrast, SEAT firefighting operations are often flown in the afternoons over rugged terrain (e.g., 
mountainous with trees), with variable winds due to the local effects from growing fires, and with extensive radio 
communications.  Radio calls are with a dispatch agency, aerial supervision, and sometimes other aircraft in the fire 
traffic area, including helicopters.  Another important distinction is that crop-dusting is most effective when 
chemicals are applied as low to the crops as practical; whereas with fire retardant, the ideal drop height is 85 feet, 
plus or minus 5 feet, above the foliage.  SEAT training and operations follow FAR Part-135 which provides more 
structure, including simulator training (starting in 2011; Figure 2), and operations and training manuals for pilots 
and maintainers.  Firefighting pilot tasks and responsibilities, therefore, are significantly different from crop-dusting 
tasks. 
 




 We began the analysis by reviewing some SEAT background information, NTSB SEAT accident reports, 
and with the desire to cast as wide a net as practical to understand the SEAT firefighting environment and 
contributing factors to the poor safety record.  We decided to use HFACS because it not only prompts analysts to 
study pilot issues, but also supervisory and organizational issues (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000).  For example, in 
the “unsafe acts” category, we examined pilot skill-based errors, decision errors, perception errors, and violations.  
Preconditions for these unsafe acts included adverse mental states, adverse physiological states, limitations, and 
personal readiness.  Supervisory issues that impact safety included inadequate supervision, inappropriate operations, 
failure to correct known problems, and supervisory violations.  And, finally, organizational issues that contribute to 
safety problems are resource management, organizational climate, organizational processes, and poor oversight. 
 
 We also thought that a survey, with the promise of confidentiality, would enable us to receive inputs from 
as many stakeholders as practical.  The BLM customers supported this goal by providing a cover letter that promised 
confidentiality. 
 
 After reading SEAT program documents (e.g., operations guides, training materials, vendor contracts), we 
attended SEAT pilot training which clearly illustrated the many challenges faced by pilots.  During the training 
program, we also interviewed stakeholders and distributed our survey.  After training, we visited SEAT bases to 
observe operations, conduct interviews, and distribute more surveys.  We obtained a video of actual firefighting 
operations, with radio calls, which further illuminated the operational tempo and numerous opportunities for errors 
and distractions. 
 
 Another key step in our method was to analyze accident, incident and safety reports from the SEAT 
program safety database.  This information gave us a historical perspective, since our personal observations were 
limited to a single fire season (2009).  We used HFACS to categorize these reports.  For more details about our 




 Results from background reading indicated the complexity of aerial firefighting operations.  Training and 
SEAT base observations reinforced these results.  On the one hand, the AT-802 is well-suited to the role of initial 
attack on a wildfire because of its range from bases located in fire-prone areas, and because of its ability to 
efficiently carry a load of fire retardant.  It can be dispatched quickly to keep fires from growing, and it affords the 
pilot good visibility from a crash-worthy (9 g) cockpit. 
 
 On the other hand, a single-pilot aircraft precludes crew coordination and sharing responsibilities for 
cockpit tasks when operations, including radio calls, become complex.  Also, the AT-802 is highly maneuverable 
and has a high-torque engine which puts it closer to its flight envelope limits than other firefighting aircraft (AMD, 
2009).  Plus, the drop gate and radio controls are both fairly complex (Figure 3).  For pilots with only agricultural 




















Figure 3.  Typical AT-802 drop gate control panel (left) and radio control panel (right).  While most SEAT pilots 
are already familiar with the drop gate controls due to their crop-dusting experiences, few have experience with the 
radio controls until they begin firefighting training. 
 
 Results from surveys and interviews indicated that the Top Three hazards were:  (1) weather & visibility; 
(2) terrain (unfamiliar, mountainous, or low-level flight over it); and (3) long periods of no operations followed by 
high activity.  The survey also asked about flying distractions, which focused our attention on:  radio 
communications and the difficult radio panel interface, other traffic in the fire area (e.g., helicopters dropping water 
on the fire), and diversions to other fires or bases.  We also noted that safety is emphasized in different ways by the 
various companies who provide SEAT services.  In particular, some companies pressure pilots to fly against a fire in 
marginal conditions because operational flights are how the companies earn more money under their BLM contracts. 
 
 The survey results revealed that training, operational support and procedural safeguards are sufficient and 
effective.  Also, maintenance and aircraft reliability were not identified as problems, even though some safety 
reports indicated otherwise.  This disparity was likely due to the timing of the safety reports from years past 
compared to the more current information gathered from interviews and surveys.  In the prior four years, before our 
analysis began, older aircraft were retired in favor of the newer AT-802. 
 
 Results from the safety report database analysis included a total of 19 reports from NTSB and federal 
SEAT accident and incident summaries (1996-2009).  In these 19 accidents or incidents, there were 5 fatalities.  
Table 1 lists the probable causes for these 19 SEAT accidents and indicates that engine failures and controlled flight 
into terrain (CFIT) are the primary causes of accidents, responsible for 80% of fatalities and for 68% of the 
accidents.  It is unclear whether the engine failures were due to maintenance or pilot performance issues.  CFIT 
accidents are distinguished from loss of control in flight (LOCIF) accidents, so the CFIT accidents reported here are 
inferred to be due to loss of pilot situation awareness.  Similarly, failure to see obstructions is also related to pilot 
situation awareness deficiencies.  Therefore, we may conclude that 80% of fatalities and 42% of accidents resulted 
from a loss of situation awareness, which may be due, in part, to the distractions mentioned above. 
 
 Further analysis of the 19 reports by phase of flight indicates that the fire retardant dropping phase is 
associated with the most accidents (63%) and fatalities (80%).  Within this phase, accidents and incidents are evenly 
distributed among approach to drop, drop, and climb after drop. 
 
 Table 2 identifies the HFACS category for the 19 accidents and incidents.  Some accidents involved 
multiple categories and subcategories, so that the total number of accidents and incidents for a given category does 
not equal the sum of the subcategories.  This table indicates that deficiencies were identified across the SEAT 






Summary of accident and incident reports (1996-2009). 
Probable Cause Number of accidents Fatalities 
Engine failure, loss of power, or throttle failure 7 1 
Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)  6 3 
Failure to see obstruction (dead trees, wires) 2 1 
Loss of control or stall 1 0 
Blown tire 1 0 
Environmental conditions 1 0 





HFACS categories and subcategories for the 19 accidents & incidents. 
HFACS Categories Number of accidents or incidents 
with these factors identified 
Unsafe acts 
 Er rors 




Preconditions for unsafe acts 
 Substandard conditions of pilots 





 I nadequate supervision 
 Planned inappropriate operations 
 Failed to correct problem 







 R esource management 
 Or ganizational climate 







 Summarizing all results from our data gathering and analysis methods, the top 12 SEAT safety problems 
that we identified, in order, are below.  To achieve this ordering, we used five main sources:  survey responses 
(weighted most heavily), interview notes, our personal observations, safety reports, and the video of actual 
operations.  We noted frequencies of problems and severity.  We placed more weight on survey responses due to the 
relatively high response rate (N=48) and the high correlation between the number of times a specific hazard was 
mentioned and its order in the Top Three list.  We assume that anonymous respondents did not collaborate on their 
responses, so the survey’s results were, in a sense, self-validating. 
1. Weather, visibility (e.g., winds over rugged terrain, smoke) 
2. Terrain awareness, CFIT (controlled flight into the terrain) 
3. Pilot skills, CTM (cockpit task management) 
4. Energy management, engine failure, loss of power, LOCIF (loss of control in flight) 
5. Air traffic 
6. Safety culture 
7. Radio chatter (i.e., radio communications not directly relevant to the SEAT pilot) 
8. Difficult radio interface (Figure 2) 
9. Poor communications (e.g., unclear drop location description from the incident commander) 
10. Workload transition (prolonged period of no flying, then significant operations) 





 While our initial sense was that in such a dangerous business the accident rate might be higher, we learned 
that many accidents and incidents were preventable, and that there are hazards that can and should be addressed as 
resources and a consensus to act dictate.  We strongly supported the BLM’s decision to transition the SEAT program 
from an FAR Part-97 operation to one that follows Part-135 as much as practical – a transition that provides more 
structure for training and evaluating pilots and maintainers due to the requirement for formal operations, training, 
and maintenance manuals.  Our recommendations focused on the categories of personnel selection and training, 
cockpit equipment and procedures, communication impediments, maintenance, and organizational issues.  Table 3 
highlights our recommendations; its third column indicates which of the 12 SEAT safety problems (above) are 
addressed by the recommendation category.  The recommendations are ordered by the number of higher ranking 













Identify and use screening tools to ensure that SEAT pilots (and other 




Targeted training can be developed to address a wide variety of issues, 
including:  energy management; allocating attention (e.g., visual scan 
patterns) to maintain awareness of the terrain, surrounding aircraft and 
obstructions; practicing radio procedures; handling sudden workload 
transitions; adopting a safety- and procedure-conscious attitude; and 




Select equipment to support improved SEAT operations.  Examples of 
equipment include:  radios with improved user interfaces for easier 
interaction; an angle of attack display for energy management; a 
modified TCAS to increase awareness of surrounding traffic; and, a 
geographic display with interaction capabilities to be used by pilots 





Improve radio communications protocol and procedures.  Train SEAT 
personnel (dispatchers, pilots, incident commanders) on improvements 
that should provide a consistent, efficient and minimalist way of 
transmitting information.  Minimize dispatch calls when automatic 





Develop and implement more stringent maintenance inspection 
procedures to ensure that all vendors are using the proper equipment 
and performing preventative maintenance as needed (on aircraft and 
support vehicles) in accordance with FARs and DoT regulations.  
Adopting applicable portions of FAR Part-135 should help here.  For 
incidents and accidents resulting from maintenance errors, perform 
more detailed HFACS-type analyses to obtain more specific 
maintenance-related contributing factors to the error (e.g., 




Implement and enforce rules that target key safety violations (e.g., 
flying below 60’ AGL except for takeoffs and landings) with severe 




Encourage the use of safety reports and do not use them to punish 
offenders, except for willful or egregious violations.  Include safety 
discussions (especially of recent accidents or incidents) in all training, 





 The BLM adopted several of our recommendations for the 2010 fire season, including:  more thorough and 
formal mission pre-briefings and debriefings; video-taping proper approach-to-drop, drop, and post-drop maneuvers 
for training purposes; requiring a training flight after 10 days of inactivity during fire season; and, discussing past 
accidents and incidents with pilots, and how they could have been avoided. 
 
 Initial assessments of the effectiveness of these adopted recommendations follow.  More formal briefings 
are not yet widespread, so their effectiveness is still to be determined.  Cockpit videos of drops over varied terrain 
have anecdotally helped newer pilots “get the proper picture.”  The 2010 fire season was also fairly slow, so training 
flights about every 10 days seemed to help with pilot proficiency, according to anecdotes from pilots and from aerial 
supervisors.  Discussions with pilots about past accidents and incidents also seemed to help pilots reflect upon what 
they would have done differently in similar circumstances, according to the recently retired SEAT program manager 
(fifth author).  These discussions covered pilot stressors, such as extended time away from home and financial 
pressures to fly in marginal conditions.  These stressors seemed to play a minor role, according to those pilots 
familiar with the accident or incident pilot, although simple awareness of such stressors may have a beneficial 
mitigating effect. 
 
 The work reported herein was accomplished in 2009.  Subsequently, the 2010 firefighting season was one 
of the safest for the SEAT program.  While this improvement is due to the hard work of many stakeholders, we are 




 The SEAT HF analysis was done under Dept. of the Interior, BLM contract L09PX00178 for the National 
Interagency Fire Center (NIFC).  We thank Alion intern M. Ziarnick who helped with the original report’s safety 
database analysis and classification.  We are indebted to Dr. Scott Shappell, co-creator of HFACS, for his advice 
during the conduct of the study, and to Matt Jurgenson who provided a video of actual aerial firefighting operations.  
NIFC staff members who provided extensive background information and context during the SEAT HF analysis 
were Joe Bates, Kevin Hamilton, Glen Claypool and Rusty Warbis.  The simulator photo (Figure 2) is courtesy of 
Tony Peckler at ATC Flight Simulators, Inc.  Lastly, we could not have completed our analysis without inputs from 
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